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Abstract
Although there is an increasing interest in examining the relationship between cognitive
ability and economic behavior, less is known about the relationship between cognitive
ability and social preferences. We investigate the relationship between signicant measures
of intelligence and measures of social preferences. We have data on a series of small-stakes
dictator-type decisions, known as Social Value Orientation (SVO), in addition to choices in
a larger-stakes dictator game. We also have access to the grade point averages (GPA) and
SAT (formerly referred to as the Scholastic Aptitude Test) outcomes of our subjects. We
nd that subjects who perform better on the math portion of the SAT are more generous
in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By contrast we nd that subjects with
a higher GPA are more selsh in the dictator game and more generous according to the
SVO. We also nd that the consistency of the subjects is related to GPA but we do not
nd evidence that it is related to either portion of the SAT.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have made improvements in understanding behavior by conceptualizing choice
as originating from a brain which is heterogenous across subjects and inuenced by external
factors. For instance, these successes include cognitive hierarchy models (Camerer et al.,
2004; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001), the discovery of a relationship between play in
games and the working memory capacity of the subject (Devetag and Warglien, 2003), the
nding that subjects apply similar strategies across fundamentally di¤erent games which are
played in parallel (Bednar et al., 2012, Savikhina and Sheremeta, 2012) and a relationship
between strategic sophistication and access to sleep (Dickinson and McElroy, 2010).
Experiments in economics tend to exhibit a great deal of subject-specic heterogeneity.
In other words, it is often the case that the range of responses varies greatly among subjects.
One possible explanation of this heterogeneity is that the subjects di¤er in their cognitive
ability.1 As a consequence, researchers have sought to identify a relationship between measures
of intelligence and outcomes in the laboratory. Specically, experiments have found that
measures of intelligence are related to performance on a dynamic savings problem (Ballinger et
al., 2011), learning optimal behavior in a decision problem (Palacios-Huerta, 2003), mistakes
on a forecasting task (Rydval, 2011), the complexity of the strategies implemented in the
repeated prisoners dilemma game (Jones, 2011), outcomes in the repeated prisoners dilemma
(Jones, 2008) and choice in a beauty contest game (Burnham et al., 2009).2
While these papers examine the relationship between intelligence and outcomes in eco-
nomics experiments, less is known about the relationship between cognitive ability and social
preferences. Clarifying the relationship between intelligence and social preferences would
seem to be useful in the interpretation of these experiments. Here we hope to shed new light
on the relationship by analyzing dictator-type allocations decisions and signicant measures
of intelligence. Our measures of intelligence include data on grade point averages (hereafter
GPA) and the national rank on the SAT.3 We refer to these measures as signicant because
1For instance, see Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
2We should note that not each such study has turned up such a relationship. For instance, Georganas et
al. (2010) nd that measures of intelligence are poorly related to the strategic sophistication in games.
3The SAT is an entrance examination for admission as a freshman to universities in the United States.
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they can have a large e¤ect on the subsequent life outcomes of the subject.
In particular, our subjects make a choice in a dictator game in which it is possible to
keep $10. Our subjects also complete a nine item Social Value Orientation (hereafter SVO)
measure for smaller monetary stakes. Each of the nine items has an individualistic response,
a prosocial response and a competitive response. The individualistic response is the one
in which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are the largest. In other words, selecting
the individualistic choice suggests that the subject neither positively nor negatively values
material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The prosocial response is the one in which
the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both the subject and the other subject are the
largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial response suggests that the subject positively
values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The competitive response is the
one in which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s accruing to the subject and the other
subject are the largest. In other words, selecting the competitive choice suggests that the
subject negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
We nd that higher GPA subjects are more selsh in the dictator game than are lower
GPA subjects. We also nd that subjects who performed better on the Math portion of the
SAT are more generous than students who performed worse. We do not nd a relationship
between the Verbal portion of the SAT and choice in the dictator game. There is also evidence
of a positive relationship generosity in the SVO and both GPA and Math SAT scores.
Each of the nine items contained in the SVO are nearly identical.4 As such, the coherence
of the choices on these items allows a measure of the consistency of a subject. We nd
evidence that GPA is related to the consistency of SVO choices. However, we do not nd
evidence of a relationship between consistency and either portion of the SAT. Additionally,
we nd some evidence that GPA is related to the consistency between the SVO and dictator
game choices. Again however, we do not nd evidence that consistency between SVO and
dictator game choices are related to either portion of the SAT.
Originally, SAT was an acronym for Scholastic Aptitude Test. However, presently the letters SAT do not
denote a sequence of words.
4See Appendix C for the SVO items.
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1.1 Related Literature
There exists a literature which examines the relationship between measures of intelligence and
economic preferences. However, much of the literature focuses on a di¤erent set of preferences,
such as time preferences or preferences toward risk. For instance, Frederick (2005) reports
that subjects who perform better on an IQ-type test exhibit more patience with respect to
payments over time and exhibit less risk aversion over small-stakes gambles.5 By contrast,
we examine the link between social preferences and measures of intelligence.6
There is also a literature which examines the relationship between the consistency of
answers and measures of intelligence. For instance, Burks et al. (2009) nds that IQ-
type test results are related to the consistency of choices made on questions involving time or
risk preferences. Eckel (1999) nds that the GPA of the student subjects is related to the
consistency of choices made on questions involving risk preferences. We perform a similar
exercise and nd some evidence that GPA is related to consistency, however we do not nd a
relationship between SAT outcomes and consistency.
Researchers have sought to understand the relationship between di¤erent personality fea-
tures and social preferences. For instance, Van Lange et al. (1997) nd that age, childhood
experiences, and family structure are all related to social preferences. Also, Swope et al.
(2008) nd a weak relationship between the personality traits of United States Naval Acad-
emy students and behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game, and prisoners
dilemma game.
To our knowledge, there are only a few other papers which examine the relationship be-
tween measures of intelligence and social preferences.7 Brandstätter and Güth (2002) report
5Also, see Benjamin et al. (2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Burks et al. (2009), Cokely and Kelley
(2009) and Dohmen et al. (2010). Yang and Lester (2008) examine the characteristics of subjects, including
intelligence, associated with susceptibility to biases. See Hoogendoorn et al. (2012) for a novel eld experiment
regarding heterogeneity in cognitive ability.
6For more on measures of cognitive ability and susceptability to biases see Bergman et al. (2010), Hoppe
and Kusterer (2011), Liberali et al. (2012), Oechssler et al. (2009), and Stanovich and West (2008). For more
on measures of cognitive ability and play in games, see Bayer and Renou (2011), Brañas-Garza et al. (2012),
Brañas-Garza et al. (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012), Putterman et al. (2011), Rydval and Ortmann (2004),
Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011), and Thöni et al. (2012).
7For studies which investigate the relationship between social preferences and cognitive ability as manipu-
lated by cognitive load, see Cornelissen et al. (2011), Hauge et al. (2009), Roch et al. (2000), and Schulz et al.
(2011).
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a negative relationship between giving in a dictator game and performance on cognitive tests.8
Ben-Ner et al. (2004) nd a negative relationship between giving in a dictator game and per-
formance on the Wonderlic test of intelligence. Further, the authors nd that this relationship
is stronger for women than for men.9 Benjamin et al. (2012) nd a weak relationship between
cognitive ability and selshness in the dictator game. These studies suggest that selshness
is increasing in the cognitive ability of the subject.
On the other hand, Millet and Dewitte (2007), nd a positive relationship between the
Raven Progressive Matrix test of intelligence and altruistic behavior. Their evidence comes
from observations of choice in an expanded version of SVO. Whereas we closely follow the
SVO format of Van Lange et al. (1997), which has three responses per item (competitive,
individualistic, and prosocial), Millet and Dewitte also employs a fourth option, altruistic.
The altruistic choice is distinguished from the prosocial choice in that, while both options
yield identical amounts to the subject, the prosocial option sends an amount identical to that
obtained by the subject, whereas the altruistic choice sends an even greater amount. In other
words, the prosocial option is an even split and the altruistic option sends an even larger
amount to the other subject, without reducing the subjects own allocation. The authors nd
evidence under rank order voting on hypothetical allocations that the measure of intelligence
is positively related to preferences for altruism.10 However, the authors do not report such a
relationship for the prosocial choices.
In this paper we nd that the outcome on the math portion of the SAT is associated
with generosity on both measures of social preferences. We nd that the GPA is related to
generosity on the SVO measure but with selshness in the dictator game. Finally, we do not
nd a relationship between the outcome of the verbal portion of the SAT and either measure
of social preferences.
8Although the authors conclude that their measure of intelligence is not related to bargaining behavior,
on page 200, the paper reports negative correlations between their measure of intelligence and giving in the
dictator game (r =  0:29, p = 0:04), and expectations of the amounts given by other dictators (r =  0:34,
p = 0:01).
9On page 587, the authors report a negative relationship, signicant at 0:1, in both specications of the
pooled data. The relationship is not signicant when restricted to male subjects, however they report that
the negative relationship is signicant at 0:05 in the OLS specication for female subjects. Visser and Roelofs
(2011) report a similar result.
10James (2011) nds empirical evidence that charitable giving is increasing in cognitive ability.
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In order to interpret our results, it is essential to have an understanding of the literature
on the SAT and GPA measures. Although to our knowledge, there does not exist a detailed
examination of the di¤erences between the SAT and GPA measures, there does exist some
research which is helpful. For instance, research shows that SAT outcomes are strongly related
to other measures of intelligence.11 The literature also nds a close relationship between SAT
scores and subsequent GPA in college.12 Despite this close relationship between SAT and GPA
measures, there remains variation in this relationship which can only be explained by factors
other than those related to intelligence. For instance, personality (Noftle and Robins, 2007;
Kappe and van der Flier, 2012), patience (Kirby et al., 2005) and self-discipline in adolescents,
(Duckworth and Seligman, 2005) have been found to vary with GPA. In summary, both the
SAT and GPAmeasures provide a measure of intelligence, however these measures, particularly
GPA, can be a¤ected by factors other than intelligence.
Finally, to better understanding the relationship between our results and previous work
on measures of intelligence and generosity, we note the research on the e¤ects of rewards for
cognitive tests. Research nds that intrinsic motivation and cognitive ability are separate
components to the outcomes of tests which require cognitive e¤ort.13 Segal (2012) nds
evidence that the heterogeneously distributed intrinsic motivation to perform on tests which
require cognitive e¤ort a¤ects results, however this intrinsic motivation is not related to self-
reported SAT scores.
In light of this literature, how do our results relate to the previous literature? First, to
our knowledge, we are the rst paper to examine the relationship between social preferences
and cognitive ability measures as signicant as GPA and SAT. Second, to the extent that
GPA outcomes are a¤ected by both cognitive ability and intrinsic motivation, as is the case
for cognitive tests with low material incentives, then our results closely follow that found by
Brandstätter and Güth (2002), Ben-Ner et al. (2004), and Benjamin et al. (2012). Similar
to these authors, we nd that giving in dictator game is negatively related to such a measure
11For instance, see Frey and Detterman (2004) and Beaujean et al. (2006).
12See Coyle and Pillow (2008) and Coyle et al. (2011).
13For instance, see Borghans et al. (2008) and Duckworth et al. (2011).
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of intelligence. Third, given reasonable assumptions about the preferences of the subjects,
it would seem that the Millet and Dewitte subjects with a preference for either altruistic
or prosocial preferences would be categorized as prosocial in our setting. Hence, similar to
Millet and Dewitte (2007), we nd a positive relationship between the outcome of a measure
of intelligence and generosity according to the SVO measure. Fourth, to the extent that SAT
scores are not signicantly a¤ected by intrinsic motivation, our results regarding the SAT
outcomes seem to be with out precedent in the literature.
2 Data and Methodology
The choices on social preferences were obtained in connection with Smith (2012). Each
subject was asked for a choice in one of two forms of a dictator game. In one treatment,
the subjects were given a standard $10 dictator game. This dictator game was presented
to the subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 41
dictator game allocations they most preferred.14 A total of 96 students enrolled in economics
classes at Rutgers University-Camden made a choice in this game. The data for this game
was collected in 5 classes of 16, 21, 39, 12 and 8 subjects.
In the other dictator game treatment, the subjects were asked for their choice in a non-
standard dictator game in which the relative allocation price is 1 to 3. In other words, the
most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most generous allocation is $0
to self and $30 to other. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the
other subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate
which of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred.15 A total of 90 students in
economics classes at Rutgers University-Camden made a choice in this nonstandard dictator
game. The data for this game was collected in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16 and 11 subjects.
We also measured the Social Value Orientation (SVO) of the subjects. Our specication
of SVO was adapted from Van Lange et al. (1997). The subjects were given the 9 SVO items
such that three items were listed on each of three pages. In Van Lange et al., the subjects
14See Appendix A for this standard dictator game.
15See Appendix B for this nonstandard dictator game.
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decided on an allocation of points which carry no nancial implications. By contrast, in our
experiment subjects were o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money, whereby the subject is
e¤ectively deciding on an allocation of a very small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO items,
the subject could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO items,
the subject could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were not
told these amounts, however they could be calculated with relative ease. The exchange rate
between the Van Lange et al. numbers and the monetary payment was designed to provide
only small monetary incentives.
Each of the nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response and a competi-
tive response. The exact items and the conversion from points to money in the SVO measure
is given in Appendix C. Following Van Lange et al., we would classify a subject as prosocial,
individualistic or competitive if the subject answered six of the nine items in a particular
fashion.
As was the point of Smith (2012), within each dictator treatment, we also varied the order
of the dictator game and the SVO measurement. Roughly half of each class made a choice in
the dictator game then the SVO items and half answered the SVO items then made a choice
in the dictator game.
The responses for the SVO and the dictator game were entered on paper. These choices
were incentivized to the extent that one out of every four subjects within each class were paid
the actual amounts obtained. In this experiment, we employed a triadic design. The subjects
were told to make their allocation decisions involving themselves ("You") and another sub-
ject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2") was to make allocations involving Other2 and
You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each subject was what was kept in the You-Other1
allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In
both the measurement of SVO and the choice in the dictator game, the status of You, Other1
and Other2 remained xed. This description of the triadic design was provided verbally by
the same male experimenter and in written form given to each subject. The experiment was
completed in less than one hour.
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The data on measures of intelligence were obtained from the O¢ ce of the Registrar of
Rutgers University-Camden. The registrar could locate data on cumulative GPA for 185 of
the 186 subjects. Data on SAT scores could only be located for 86 of the 186 subjects. The
SAT scores were only available for students who were admitted as freshmen. In other words,
the SAT scores for transfer students were not available.
3 Results
3.1 Overview
In the standard dictator game, subjects kept on average $6:11 (SD = 2:66). In the nonstan-
dard dictator game, subjects kept on average $7:18 (SD = 2:83). The SVO categorized 40:5%
(75) of the subjects as prosocial, 39:5% (73) as individualistic, and 4:9% (9) as competitive.
We were not able to categorize 15:1% (28) of the subjects because they did not select a mini-
mum of 6 response items of a particular type. The subjects accrued an average of $14:47 and
again we note that 25% were paid the amount.
We now present an overview of the variables which we use in the analysis. The variable
SVO First obtains a value of 1 if the SVO was administered rst and 0 otherwise. The
Standard Dictator variable obtains a 1 if the standard dictator was used and a 0 otherwise.
We use two measures of the amount kept in the dictator game: Dictator Kept and Dictator
Fraction Kept. The variable Dictator Kept is simply the amount kept in the dictator game.
In the case of both the standard version and the nonstandard version, this can range from
0 to 10. The variable Dictator Fraction Kept normalizes the amount of money kept in the
dictator game by the total amount of money given to both players. Obviously this amount
ranges from 0 to 1.
The variable GPA is the cumulative GPA of the student as of Fall 2009. Math SAT and
Verbal SAT express the percentiles of the results on these portions of the SAT. The variable
Female takes a value of 1 if the subject is female and 0 otherwise. The registrar also provided
the birthdays of the subjects. From this we calculate Age which is the number of years old
as of January 1, 2010. The variable Class indicates the last two digits of the expected year of
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graduation. For instance, a student expected to graduate in 2011 would obtain a value of 11.
The Prosocial variable takes a value of 1 if the subject was categorized as having prosocial
preferences according to the SVO and 0 otherwise. The Classication variable obtains a value
of 1 if the SVO classies the subject as either prosocial, individualistic, or competitive. We
provide the summary statistics for these variables in Table 1.
Table 1-Summary of the variables
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SVO First 185 0:502 0:501 0 1
Standard Dictator 185 0:514 0:501 0 1
Dictator Kept 185 6:631 2:792 0 10
Dictator Fraction Kept 185 0:583 0:277 0 1
GPA 185 3:045 0:597 0:323 4:00
Math SAT 86 48:686 19:653 4:0 74:0
Verbal SAT 86 47:116 15:681 5:0 75:0
Female 185 0:357 0:480 0 1
Age 184 22:08 5:27 17:04 60:62
Class 185 10:37 0:805 9 13
Prosocial 185 0:405 0:492 0 1
Classication 185 0:848 0:359 0 1
We note that, although we conduct the experiment in a college setting, there are several
students who are older than typical college students.16 We considered dropping these subjects
as outliers however, it was not obvious precisely which students should be excluded and we
note that the age variable is not central to the study. We also note that there are no signicant
di¤erences in the Dictator Kept, Dictator Fraction Kept, GPA or Prosocial variables of the
subjects who have SAT data available and those who do not. Finally, we do not nd a
signicant di¤erence between the Dictator Kept, Dictator Fraction Kept, GPA, Prosocial or
SAT variables of the subjects in each of the 9 experimental sessions.17
3.2 Measures of Intelligence and Behavior in the Dictator Game
We now examine the relationship between our measures of intelligence and choice in the
dictator game. We perform the following regressions with a dependent variable of Dictator
16The age of the subjects over 30 include: 60, 52, 42, 38, 37, 33, 32, and three instances of 31.
17These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Kept.18 Regression (1) employs only our measures of intelligence: GPA and SAT outcomes.
Regressions (2) and (3) consider only the GPA and SAT outcomes, respectively, along with
the details of the treatment: the order of the experiment, the type of dictator game and the
interaction. Regression (4) considers all three intelligence measures and the details of the
treatment. Finally, regression (5) considers all three measures of intelligence, the details of
the treatment, and background details for the subjects. We summarize the results in Table
2.
Table 2-Relationship between Dictator Kept and Measures of Intelligence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 1:236 0:403   1:103 1:208
(0:517) (0:347) (0:510) (0:548)
Math SAT  0:0300    0:0370  0:0395  0:0402
(0:0152) (0:0151) (0:0149) (0:0155)
Verbal SAT 0:0152   0:0149 0:0107 0:00623
(0:0192) (0:0188) (0:0185) (0:0191)
SVO First    0:881  2:751  2:593  2:639
(0:580) (0:853) (0:837) (0:849)
Standard Dictator    1:388  2:084  1:863  1:5317
(0:574) (0:791) (0:780) (0:840)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:812 3:277 3:340 3:319
(0:807) (1:182) (1:157) (1:181)
Female          0:112
(0:671)
Age         0:118
(0:114)
Class          0:182
(0:453)
R2 0:11 0:06 0:17 0:22 0:24
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
Result of regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
We nd a relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and GPA. In
regressions (1), (4), and (5) we nd that higher GPA subjects keep more in the dictator game,
18 In each of the regressions which follow, the analogous analysis, conducted with tobit regressions, does not
yield di¤erent conclusions. These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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than do lower GPA subjects. We also nd a negative relationship between the amount kept
in the dictator game and Math SAT. In regressions (1), (3), (4), and (5) we nd that higher
Math SAT subjects keep less in the dictator game than do lower Math SAT subjects. Finally,
note that we do not nd a relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and
Verbal SAT.
We note the signicant relationships which are related to the details of the experiment.
As does Smith (2012), we nd that the order of the presentation of the experimental material
is related to choice. In particular, we nd that subjects who rst responded to the SVO
were more generous in the dictator game than subjects who responded rst to the dictator
game. We also note that the coe¢ cient involving the specication of the dictator game is
signicant in regressions (2)-(5). Further, the interaction between the order and the form of
the game is signicant in regressions (3), (4), and (5).19 Finally, we note when we separately
run the regressions for both forms of the dictator game, the sign of the coe¢ cient estimates
of our measures of intelligence are unchanged. Although we note that in these regressions,
the coe¢ cient estimates are largely not signicant.20
While we are encouraged by the results summarized in Table 2, it is potentially problematic
that the term involving the form of the dictator game is signicant. In order to account for this
feature, we perform the analogous analysis as above, with the exception that the dependent
variable is the fraction kept in the dictator game. We summarize the results in Table 3.
19 In contrast to Ben-Ner et al. (2004) we do not nd a signicant interaction between gender and our
measures of intelligence in the regressions involving either dictator giving or generosity as measured by SVO.
20These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Table 3-Relationship between Dictator Fraction Kept and Measures of Intelligence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 0:114 0:0531   0:130 0:138
(0:0518) (0:0348) (0:0497) (0:0531)
Math SAT  0:00263    0:00323  0:00353  0:00388
(0:00152) (0:00149) (0:00145) (0:00150)
Verbal SAT 0:00164   0:00159 0:00111 0:000563
(0:00192) (0:00185) (0:00180) (0:00185)
SVO First    0:0823  0:263  0:245  0:247
(0:0582) (0:0841) (0:0815) (0:0823)
Standard Dictator   0:0291  0:0378  0:0118 0:0309
(0:0576) (0:0780) (0:0759) (0:0815)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:0776 0:315 0:322 0:301
(0:0809) (0:117) 0:113 (0:115)
Female          0:0693
(0:0651)
Age         0:007101
(0:0111)
Class          0:0326
(0:0439)
R2 0:10 0:04 0:18 0:25 0:27
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
Result of regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
Despite the di¤erences in the dependent variables, the qualitative results presented in Table
2 remain largely unchanged here. In particular, we note a positive relationship between the
amount kept in the dictator game and GPA, as seen in regressions (1), (4), and (5). We also
observe a negative relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and Math SAT,
as in regressions (1), (3)-(5). Finally, we do not observe a signicant relationship between
Verbal SAT and the amount kept in the dictator game.
Also similar to the results of Table 2, here we nd that the SVO First and the interaction
terms are signicant in regressions (3)-(5). However, unlike the previous analysis, here we
nd that the form of the dictator game is not signicant. In our view this suggests that the
use of the fraction of money kept is capturing the di¤erences in behavior due to the di¤erent
forms of the dictator games.
13
In summary, we observe a positive relationship between intelligence, as measured by GPA
and selshness in the dictator game. We also observe a negative relationship between in-
telligence, as measured by Math SAT, and selshness in the dictator game. Finally, we do
not observe a signicant relationship between intelligence, as measured by Verbal SAT, and
selshness in the dictator game.
3.3 Measures of Intelligence and SVO
We now turn our attention to the relationship between the SVO classication and our mea-
sures of intelligence. In particular, we examine the relationship between the measurement of
generosity according to the SVO measure and intelligence. As such, we employ the dummy,
Prosocial, as the dependent variable. Recall that this variable takes a value of 1 if the subject
was classied as prosocial by SVO and 0 otherwise. In our view, this measure of generos-
ity because the individualistic, competitive and unclassied subjects each failed to select the
generous allocation in at least 4 of the 9 SVO items.
In regression (1) we include all three measures of intelligence and the order treatment.
Regressions (2) and (3) includes only the GPA measure or the SAT measures respectively, in
addition to the order treatment. In regression (4) we include all three measures of intelligence,
the order treatment, and characteristics of the subjects. Table 4 presents the summary of
this analysis.
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Table 4-The Prosocial variable and Measures of Intelligence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA 0:962 0:484   0:883
(0:455) (0:269) (0:484)
Math SAT 0:0275   0:0291 0:0312
(0:0138) (0:0141) (0:014)
Verbal SAT 0:0254   0:0259 0:0249
(0:0179) (0:0174) (0:0186)
SVO First 0:969  0:165 0:738 1:1251
(0:518) (0:306) (0:483) (0:5504)
Female       0:545
(0:580)
Age        0:00219
(0:0904)
Class        0:297
(0:383)
-2 log L 100:18 245:77 105:05 98:48
LR 2 13:36 4:03 8:48 15:05
Observations 86 185 86 86
Result of logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, **
indicates signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
First, we nd some evidence of a positive relationship between GPA and the prosocial
classication. This relationship is signicant at the 0:05 level in regression (1) and signicant
at the 0:10 level in regressions (2) and (4). In other words, higher GPA subjects are more
likely to be categorized as being generous by SVO. We also nd a positive relationship between
Math SAT scores and the prosocial classication. This relationship is signicant at the 0:05
level in regressions (1), (3) and (4). In other words, higher Math SAT subjects are more
likely to be categorized as being generous by SVO. Again we do not nd such a relationship
involving Verbal SAT.
We also note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is signicant at the 0:1 level in regression (1)
and at the 0:05 level in regression (4). Unlike the analysis summarized in Tables 2 and 3,
we do not include the indicating the specication of the dictator game and the type-order
interaction. However, when we do include these variables, neither are signicant.21
21These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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3.4 Measures of Intelligence and Consistency
Finally, we turn our attention to the relationship between the consistency of choices and our
measures of intelligence. Recall that the SVO measure consists of nine nearly identical items.
If the subject answers six of the nine items in the same manner then the SVO will classify the
subject as one of three types. It seems reasonable to use the condition of being classied as a
measure of consistency. Therefore, as a dependent variable we use the dummy, Classication,
which assigns a 1 to a subject who is classied according to their choices of SVO and 0
otherwise. Table 5 summarizes our analysis.
Table 5-The Classication Variable and Measures of Intelligence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA 0:9279 0:871   0:742
(0:4751) (0:337) (0:499)
Math SAT 0:0145   0:0153 0:0179
(0:0133) (0:0126) (0:0142)
Verbal SAT 0:0168   0:0192 0:0145
(0:0163) (0:0157) (0:0169)
SVO First 0:6019 0:351 0:428 0:698
(0:5576) (0:426) (0:536) (0:589)
Female       0:174
(0:645)
Age        0:0737
(0:0922)
Class        0:549
(0:398)
-2 log L 86:339 150:26 90:32 84:40
LR 2 6:95 7:01 2:97 8:88
Observations 86 185 86 86
Result of logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, **
indicates signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
Here we nd some evidence that GPA is related to consistency. Specically, in regression
(1) we nd that GPA is related to consistency at the 0:1 level, and it is signicant at the 0:01
level in regression (3). However, we note that GPA is not signicantly related to consistency
in regression (4). Surprisingly, we do not nd a relationship between the SAT, in particular
the Math portion of the SAT, and consistency.
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We also consider another notion of consistency: the agreement between the choices on
the SVO and that made in the dictator game. To accomplish this, we rst run two sets
of regressions. The rst set is with Dictator Fraction Kept as the dependent variable and
Prosocial as an independent variable. The second set of regressions uses the squared residuals
obtained in the rst set, with measures of intelligence as the independent variables. In this
way we can determine if these measures of intelligence are related to the agreement between
the choices on the SVO and the choice made in the dictator game.
In both regressions (1) and (2) below we use the responses on the SVO as an independent
variable and the fraction of money kept in the dictator game as dependent variable. In
regression (1) we also include the SVO First as an independent variable. In regression (2) we
also include the Standard Dictator and SVO First- Standard Dictator interaction. Table 6
summarizes these results.
Table 6-Relationship between Dictator Fraction Kept and SVO
(1) (2)
Prosocial  0:222  0:217
(0:0382) (0:0389)
SVO First  0:0628  0:0946
(0:0375) (0:0539)
Standard Dictator    0:00829
(0:0535)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:0612
(0:0752)
R2 0:16 0:17
Observations 185 185
Result of regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and * indi-
cates signicance at p < 0:10.
Now we use the squared residuals obtained in the regressions summarized in Table 6 as
dependent variables in the regressions summarized below. In each of the regressions below,
we use the measures of intelligence as independent variables in order to determine if the
agreement between SVO and dictator choices is related to our measures of intelligence. In
regressions (1:1), (1:2) and (1:3) below, we use the squared residuals obtained in regression
(1) as summarized in Table 7 as the dependent variable. In regressions (2:1), (2:2) and (2:3)
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below, we used the squared residuals obtained in regression (2) as summarized in Table 7 as
the dependent variable.
Table 7-Relationship Between Consistency and Measures of Intelligence
(1:1) (1:2) (1:3) (2:1) (2:2) (2:3)
GPA  :0245    0:0259  0:0234    0:0251
(0:0120) (0:0185) (0:0119) (0:0177)
Math SAT   0:000225 0:000294   0:000174 0:000240
(0:000546) (0:000545) (0:000524) (0:000523)
Verbal SAT    0:000992  0:000875    0:000964  0:000851
(0:000685) (0:000686) (0:000656) (0:000657)
R2 0:02 0:03 0:05 0:02 0:03 0:05
Observations 185 86 86 185 86 86
The dependent variable of regressions (1:1), (1:2) and (1:3) is the squared resid-
uals of regression (1) as summarized in Table 6. The dependent variable of regres-
sions (2:1), (2:2) and (2:3) is the squared residuals of regression (2) as summarized
in Table 6. Further, ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signi-
cance at p < 0:10.
Similar to the analysis summarized in Table 5, we nd some evidence that GPA is related
to consistency. In both regressions (1:1) and (2:1) we nd that GPA is related to consistency
as measured by the agreement between SVO and dictator game choices. However, this
relationship is not robust to changes in the model. In particular, when we include the
outcomes on the SAT, GPA is no longer signicant. Also similar to the results summarized
in Table 5, here we also do not nd a relationship between the squared residuals and either
portion of the SAT. Finally, we note that when the above analysis is conducted with the
absolute value of the residuals, rather than the squared residuals, we nd evidence of an even
weaker relationship. In particular, the GPA coe¢ cient in the analogous version of Regression
(1:1) is only signicant at the 0.1 level and the analogous version of Regression (2:1) is not
signicant.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Increasingly in economics, researchers are interested in examining the relationship between
cognitive ability and economic behavior. However, before researchers can make accurate
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inferences of strategic choices given measures of cognitive ability, we must have a better un-
derstanding of other relevant correlates of cognitive ability. As such, in this paper we examine
the relationship between signicant measures of intelligence and social preferences.
We nd that our measures of intelligence are related to social preferences. In particular,
we nd evidence of a negative relationship between performance on the Math portion of the
SAT and selshness in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By contrast, we nd
a positive relationship between GPA and selshness in the dictator game, but a negative
relationship between GPA and selshness on the SVO measure. Finally, we only nd some
evidence of a relationship between GPA and consistency of choices, however we do not nd
such evidence for either portion of the SAT.
To the extent that GPA is a¤ected by both cognitive ability and intrinsic motivation,
as evidence suggests it is for cognitive tests with small material incentives, then our results
regarding GPA closely resemble that found in the literature. In this sense, we view our
results as o¤ering a complementary view of the e¤ects of cognitive tests which are a¤ected
by heterogenous intrinsic motivation. However, to our knowledge, our results regarding SAT
outcomes are novel.
We also note that we do not nd evidence of a systematic a¤ect of gender on social
preferences. Previous work has found a relationship between gender and generosity,22 however
our data does not support such a relationship.
While we are encouraged by our results, there is more to be explored. For instance,
additional data is needed in order to better identify the relative merits of the measures of
intelligence which we use. We are also aware of the limitations of the measures of social
preferences which we use. One way to remedy this would be to conduct a thorough investi-
gation of social preferences, ala Charness and Rabin (2002), when considering such signicant
measures of intelligence.
22For instance, see Eckel and Grossman (1998), Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Ben-Ner et al. (2004).
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Appendix A
Standard Dictator Game
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Appendix B
Nonstandard Dictator Game
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Appendix C
Social Value Orientation (SVO)
We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et al., 1997) in order to measure the SVO
of the subjects. Each of the 9 items has a prosocial answer, a individualistic answer and a
competitive answer. Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to
$0.02103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
Question 8 A B C
You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C. The prosocial
answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B. The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C,
3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A. Van Lange et al. classies a subject according to the above
labels if six or more items are selected in a similar fashion.
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